Privatisation & Loyalty in the War on Terror

Hessian mercenaries surrender to Washington at the Battle of Trenton in 1776. (Library of Congress)

A recent post by Indi on the correctness of allowing people with foreign interests to hold high military office got me thinking about the whole private military contract business. Coincidentally, I had just finished reading The Road to Hell by Brian Geddes, a British mercenary (or private military contractor as they are now called) in Iraq.Indi’s post basically pointed out that the SL Army commander, Gen Sarath Fonseka, the Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, and a few others who are US green card holders, cannot be trusted to hold such high positions as their loyalties could possibly be divided.

Regardless of whether Gota & Co are actually foreigners or not, I tend to think that nationality is beside the point when it comes to fighting a war — or cleaning up after it for that matter. The soldier of fortune or mercenary warrior has had a long career — one that parallels the history of the citizen soldier, both in length and quality. Mercenaries have been employed as far back in time as the 13th Century BC, when Pharaoh Rameses II employed 11,000 mercenaries. In the 3rd Century BC, Hannibal of Carthage used Spanish and French mercenaries in his conquest of Italy, and Roman Caesars hired Visigoths to serve as the Praetorian Guard. More recently, the British used Hessian mercenaries against George Washington in his War of Independence. Two of the biggest private armies in history were the British and Dutch East India Companies which carried out proxy wars on behalf of the British and Dutch rulers, and were commercially motivated. Other famous mercenary organisations like the French Foreign Legion and the Gurkha regiments have rightfully earned a ferocious reputation as fighting troops.